Experimental demonstration of four-party quantum secret sharing by Gaertner, S. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
10
11
2v
1 
 1
3 
O
ct
 2
00
6
Experimental demonstration of four-party quantum secret sharing
S. Gaertner,1, 2 C. Kurtsiefer,3 M. Bourennane,4 and H. Weinfurter1, 2
1Sektion Physik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t, 80799 Mu¨nchen, Germany
2Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Quantenoptik, D-85748 Garching, Germany
3Department of Physics, National University of Singapore, 117542 Singapore, Singapore
4Physics Department, Stockholm University, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
Secret sharing is a multiparty cryptographic task in which some secret information is splitted
into several pieces which are distributed among the participants such that only an authorized set of
participants can reconstruct the original secret. Similar to quantum key distribution, in quantum
secret sharing, the secrecy of the shared information relies not on computational assumptions, but
on laws of quantum physics. Here, we present an experimental demonstration of four-party quantum
secret sharing via the resource of four-photon entanglement.
Entanglement is a fundamental resource for many
quantum communication schemes. Bipartite entangle-
ment has been used for the experimental demonstration
of two-party quantum communication schemes like quan-
tum dense coding [1], quantum teleportation [2] or en-
tanglement based quantum cryptography [3]. Similar to
such two-party quantum communication schemes, multi-
partite entanglement allows the experimental implemen-
tation of multiparty quantum communication schemes,
like multiparty quantum teleportation [4], quantum tele-
cloning [5], multiparty quantum key distribution or quan-
tum secret sharing (QSS) [6].
Secret sharing was introduced independently in 1979
by Shamir and Blakely [7, 8]. In a secret sharing scheme
between n participants a designated party, usually called
the dealer, splits some secret information into n−1 shares
and distributes these shares to each participant in such
a way that only a particular authorized set of partici-
pants can reconstruct that secret information. The qual-
ified subsets of participants who can recover the secret
are called access sets, subsets which have no informa-
tion about the secret are called non-access sets and sub-
sets which have partial information are called semi-access
sets [9]. Secret sharing has many different applications,
e.g. the management of cryptographic keys, the estab-
lishment of access codes with restricted access and as a
component of secure multiparty computation.
In contrast to classical secret sharing, the information
splitting of a secret and the information distribution in
QSS is realized by local measurements on distributed
quantum states. Therefore, QSS allows to distribute the
shares securely in the presence of eavesdropping. More-
over, QSS distinguishes further between QSS of classical
information [6] and QSS of quantum information [10].
Here, we consider QSS of classical information. Different
protocols for three and four-party QSS using the resource
of multipartite entanglement have been proposed [6, 11].
But, until now, only three-photon entanglement has been
used to proof the experimental feasibility and to give an
experimental demonstration of three-party QSS [12, 13].
In this Letter, we present the first experimental demon-
stration of four-party QSS via four-photon entanglement.
In this scheme, any one of the four participants can act as
the dealer, while the remaining three participants form
the access set. For the experimental implementation,
we use the following four-photon polarization-entangled
state [14, 15]:
|Ψ−4 〉 =
1
2
√
3
[
2|HHV V 〉 − |HVHV 〉 − |HV V H〉 (1)
−|V HHV 〉 − |V HV H〉+ 2|V VHH〉
]
abcd
where H and V denotes horizontal and vertical po-
larization of photons in the four spatial modes a, b, c
and d. This state shows perfect four-photon polariza-
tion correlations as indicated by the four-photon po-
larization correlation function defined as the expecta-
tion value of the product of the four operators sˆx =
|+,Φ〉x〈+,Φ|− |−,Φ〉x〈−,Φ| , with eigenstates |±,Φ〉x =
1/
√
2(|R〉 ± eiφx |L〉) and eigenvalues ±1, where R and L
denote right- and lefthanded circular polarization. The
explicit expression of this correlation function for the
four-photon state given by Eq. (1), is:
E(φa, φb, φc, φd) =
2
3
cos(φa + φb − φc − φd) (2)
+
1
3
cos(φa − φb) cos(φc − φd) .
Another property of this state, which is useful for the
realization of multiparty secure quantum communication,
is its ability to violate a four-party Bell inequality [16]:
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where each index y = k, l,m, n denotes a pair of an-
gles defining the local polarization measurement settings
required for the evaluation. A strong violation of this
Bell inequality (with S = 1.886) is obtained e.g. for
φ1,2b = 0, pi/2 and φ
1,2
a,c,d = pi/4,−pi/4, or any other set-
ting resulting by permutation of the indices.
The four-party QSS protocol works as follows: Al-
ice, Bob, Claire and David share each a photon from
2the |Ψ−4 〉 state. In the following, we assume that Al-
ice is the dealer. Each party chooses randomly between
two complementary measurement bases. This can be for
example either the {H,V } and {P,M} basis (φx = 0,
pi/2) analog to the BB84 protocol [17], or a basis set
like {{22.5◦, 112.5◦}, {−22.5◦, 67.5◦}} (φx = pi/4,−pi/4),
which can also be used to violate the Bell inequality given
by Eq. (3), in analogy to the Ekert scheme [18]. To trans-
fer the measurement results into a key sequence, each
participant identifies his result either with a bit value of
0 or 1. The measurements will be repeated until they
have established a raw key of desired length. For key
sifting, each participant announces publicly whenever he
has registered a photon and which measurement basis
he has used, but not the results. For the announcement,
Bob, Claire and David send their information about their
measurement to Alice. After that, Alice can decide which
quadruples will be used for secure communication: Ac-
cording to Eq. (2), she will keep those results where all
participants used the same basis setting and will drop all
others.
The information splitting works as follows: Consider
e.g the case where all four parties have measured in the
{H,V } basis. Suppose Bob obtained the result |H〉b
(|V 〉b), then he can not predict with certainty the mea-
surement result of Alice, because there are two different
possible outcomes for her. Similarly, each other partic-
ipant is not able to obtain the secret of Alice without
cooperation. Let us now consider pairwise cooperation.
If Bob and Claire obtained the result |HV 〉bc (|V H〉bc),
both together are not able to get the secret. They need
the help of David to determine the key bit of Alice. Only
in cases where Bob and Claire have obtained the result
|HH〉bc (|V V 〉bc) they can infer the key bit without the
help of David. The same is true for Bob and David, or
Claire and David. This implies that always two of them
have some partial information on Alice’s key. However,
Bob, Claire and David must cooperate to retrieve the
complete key and to ensure perfect information-theoretic
security, the partial information of any semi-access set
can be removed by the application of a hash function
(privacy amplification) [19, 20].
After key sifting, all participants have to check for ex-
ternal eavesdropping. Depending on their chosen basis
settings they can proceed as follows: If they used a basis
set similar to the BB84 protocol, they can use a fraction
of their measurement results (which should be perfectly
correlated) for the evaluation of the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) defined as the ratio of wrong bits to all
bits. If the QBER is low enough, they can use their re-
sults to distill a secure key, otherwise they have to discard
their bits [21]. If they used a basis set which can be used
to violate the Bell inequality given by Eq. (3), they can
use a fraction of their measurement results for the evalu-
ation. If the violation is high enough, they can use their
key bits, otherwise they have to drop them [22].
To finally obtain a common secure key, they have to
perform key reconciliation and privacy amplification. For
this, different strategies developed for quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) can be adapted [19, 23]. After that,
Alice can use the final key for an unbreakable encryp-
tion of her secret information via the Vernam cipher [24]
and broadcasts the encrypted message to Bob, Claire and
David. Cooperation of Bob, Claire and David allows the
reconstruction of the key and therefore to obtain the se-
cret information of Alice.
The four-party QSS protocol was experimentally im-
plemented as sketched in Fig. 1. We used a mode-locked
Ti:Sapphire laser emitting pulses with a pulse length
of about 120 fs at a repetition rate of 82 MHz. This
radiation is frequency-doubled with a lithium-triborate
crystal to λ = 390 nm which is used to pump a 2 mm
thick beta-barium-borate crystal to generate the four-
photon polarization-entangled state given by Eq. (1) via
pulsed type-II parametric down-conversion. This state
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the experimental implementation: The
four-photon source distributes the four photons of the en-
tangled state |Ψ−
4
〉 into the four modes a, b, c and d. Each
party uses a random number generator (RNG) which sets a
half-wave plate (HWP) angle and a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS) followed by two avalanche photodiodes for the analysis
and registration of the distributed photons.
results directly from the four-photon emission of the
pulsed down-conversion source and the usage of two beam
splitters to distribute these photons into the four spatial
modes a, b, c and d [15, 25]. Alice, Bob, Claire and David
obtain each a photon from the four-photon state and
measure randomly in one of two complementary bases
chosen by a random number generator orienting a half-
wave plate in front of a polarizing beam splitter via step
motors. For the encoding, the detection of a photon in
the transmitted (reflected) output mode of the polarizing
beam splitter is set to a bit value of 0 (1). The four pho-
tons were detected by eight silicon avalanche photodiodes
with detection efficiencies of about 40%. For the registra-
tion of all 16 relevant four-photon coincidences, we used
an eight-channel multi-photon coincidence unit [26]. We
3observed a four-photon state rate of about 0.4 per sec-
ond. To build up a shared key, the acquisition time for
each randomly chosen analysis setting was set to 1 s. If
more than one four-photon coincidence event was regis-
tered during that time, only the first one was chosen.
An analysis of the four-photon source used for the ex-
perimental implementation, where Alice, Bob, Claire and
David have measured in the {H,V } basis is shown in
Fig. 2. The data acquisition time was 24 hours. Due
to differences in the efficiencies of the detectors, the
presented four-photon coincidences have been corrected
FIG. 2: Analysis of the four-photon source, where Alice, Bob
Claire and David have chosen the {H,V } basis for their po-
larization analysis. Shown are all possible four-photon coinci-
dence detection events under the condition that in each of the
four output modes a photon was detected. The four-photon
correlation is E = 0.945 ± 0.002.
without changing the overall raw detection rate. The cor-
responding four-photon correlation is E = 0.945± 0.002,
which demonstrates the high quality and stability of this
four-photon source.
To demonstrate the perfect four-party correlations,
necessary for four-party QSS, we analyzed the four-
photon correlations under different polarization analyzer
orientations. In Fig. 3 (a) the results of two measure-
ments are shown, where Alice, Claire and David have
analyzed their photons in the {H,V } ({P,M}) basis cor-
responding to φa,c,d = 0 (pi/2), while Bob varied his anal-
ysis direction φb from 0 to 4pi. The maximal absolute
value of E(φa, φb, φc, φd) can be expressed by a visibility
V according to E = V E, where E denotes the theoretical
value. Fitting the experimental data leads to a visibility
of VH/V = 92.3±0.8% and VP/M = 88.2±1.2%. Figure 3
(b) shows the experimental results obtained from two
measurements, where Alice, Claire and David analyzed
their photons in the {22.5◦, 112.5◦} ({−22.5◦, 67.5◦}) ba-
sis corresponding to φa,c,d = pi/4 (−pi/4), while Bob
varied his analyzer setting φb. The resulting visibili-
ties are V22.5◦/112.5◦ = 90.2 ± 1.1% and V−22.5◦/67.5◦ =
89.0 ± 0.7%, respectively. The overall data acquisition
time for each four-photon correlation function was 8.5
hours. The average visibility can be translated into the
FIG. 3: Four-photon polarization correlations: Alice, Claire
and David have set their polarization analysis orientation
(φa, φc, φd) in (a) either to 0 (rounds) or pi/2 (triangles) cor-
responding to the {{H,V }, {P,M}} basis set, or in (b) either
to +pi/4 (rounds) or −pi/4 (triangles) corresponding to the
{{22.5◦, 112.5◦}, {−22.5◦, 67.5◦}} basis set, while Bob varied
his polarization analyzer setting (φb) from 0 to 4pi. The solid
and the dashed lines represent numerical fits, leading in (a) to
a visibility of VH/V = 92.3%±0.8% and VP/M = 88.2%±1.2%,
and in (b) to a visibility of V22.5◦/112.5◦ = 90.2% ± 1.1% and
V
−22.5◦/67.5◦ = 89.0% ± 0.7%.
QBER via QBER = (1 − V )/2 leading to a QBER of
4.88± 0.50% and 5.22± 0.45% for each basis set [27].
For a full experimental demonstration of four-party
QSS, we performed a key exchange according to the four-
party QSS protocol described above using two different
complementary basis sets. Using a key sifting analog to
the BB84 protocol, we have exchanged 2000 key bits in a
complete transfer time of about 16 hours with a QBER of
5.20%. A fraction of 100 bits of the sifted key is shown in
Fig. 4. Neglecting the dead time required to set the po-
larization analysis direction and considering in addition
those events which have been registered in the same time
interval, leads to a bit rate of 196 bits per hour being
in well agreement with the theoretical expected rate. To
check for eavesdropping, Alice chooses a random subset
of 200 bits (10%) of the sifted key and asks Bob, Claire
and David for their results at those positions. From this
subset, she evaluates the QBER and obtains a value of
4% [28]. This value lies well below several known se-
curity threshold values required for two-party QKD and
should therefore be low enough to distill finally a perfect
secure key [21, 27]. Thus, using the remaining 1800 bits
4xA 0100111110101111000001000011000000110011110001011000110000111110011111110001010111101001100000001110
xB 0011110101101101000100011010110111010111100101010110010100101111010101101001011111101011101001001010
xC 1010000000010010111110111100001111101000011010100111101111000011101001010110101000010110011111100001
xD 1101001011010000111011100101111000001100001010101001001011010000100010001110100000010100010110110101
xAS 0100111110101111000001000011000000110011110101011000110000111100011110110001010111101001100000011110
FIG. 4: Sifted key: Shown are 100 out of 2000 experimentally exchanged four-party key bits. Bits printed in bold indicate
errors. The first row shows the key of Alice denoted by xA. The second, third and fourth row shows each 100 key bits of Bob,
Claire and David denoted by xB, xC and xD. As can be seen, no one of them alone and no two parties of them together are
able to obtain the key of Alice. Only by cooperation of Bob, Claire and David (access set) they will be able to reconstruct the
key of Alice via the computation of the logical XOR function (xAS = xB ⊕ xC ⊕ xD = xA), as shown in the last row.
to perform key reconciliation and privacy amplification,
Alice ends up with a totally secure key with about 200
bits [29]. For the reconstruction of the final key, Bob,
Claire and David have to combine their individual bits of
the reconciled key and have to perform the same privacy
amplification procedure as Alice.
Using the Bell angles (φ1,2x = pi/4,−pi/4) for key
sifting, while Bob switches every fifth measurement to
φ1,2b = 0, pi/2, we obtained 1342 key bits in about 21
hours with a QBER of 5.96%. Since 1/5 of the mea-
sured data can be used to evaluate the Bell inequality
given by Eq. (3), we obtained a value of S = 1.78± 0.07,
which is well above the classical limit of 1 and very close
to the theoretical value of 1.886. Since the value for S
scales linear with the visibility, the achieved value of S
can be translated into a QBER of about 3%, which should
be low enough to ensure secure quantum communication
[21, 27].
We demonstrated four-party QSS via the resource of
four-photon entanglement. We obtained bit rates of
about 100 bits per hour with QBERs of about 5%, which
should be low enough to ensure perfect security. Compar-
ing this with QBERs usually obtained in QKD between
two parties, we obtain similar results demonstrating the
feasibility of secure multiparty quantum communication
via multi-photon entanglement. For future implementa-
tions, it would be useful to use fast optical switches for
an efficient registration. Using in addition known tech-
niques to increase the efficiency of the key exchange, this
scheme can be extended to obtain the maximal reachable
efficiency [30].
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